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Labor Law-Union Must Provide Attorney Representation Without 
Regard to Union Membership-National Treasury Employees Union 
v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 721 F.2d 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Labor-
Management Statute)· sets forth union guidelines for collective bargain-
ing representation in the federal sector. 2 A labor organization with 
recognized exclusivity is responsible for the non-discriminatory represen-
tation of all bargaining unit employees without regard to union 
membership.3 In National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor 
Relations Authority, 4 a case of first impression, the court considered 
whether a federal employees union may, in accordance with statutory 
obligations, consider union membership in determining the type of 
representation it provides to individual employees. S The court held 
that by denying non-union members attorney representation and 
substituting representation by a shop steward or chapter official, the 
National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) committed an unfair 
labor practice and violated the duty of fair representation. 6 
The NTEU represents federal employees of the United States 
Customs Service and United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 7 
In 1978, NTEU informed employees of its policy of providing attorney 
representation to union members and shop steward or chapter of-
ficial representation to non-union members. 8 The Federal Labor Rela-
tions Authority (FLRA) held that this policy violated Executive Order 
I. Title VII, Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, 1191-1216 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (Supp. V 1981». 
2. See 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(1) (Supp. v 1981) (interests of all bargaining unit employees 
must be represented without discrimination or regard to union membership); id. §§ 7116(b)(I), 
(b)(8) (unfair labor practice to interfere with employee rights and refuse to comply with any 
statutory section). 
3. Id. § 7114(a)(I). 
4. 721 F.2d 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) policy 
of representation is a very common, yet typically unwritten, union practice. See Middleton, 
Union Told To Give Legal Aid To All, 6 NAT'L L.J. 1,6, (Dec. 13, 1983) (unions commonly 
fail to provide attorney represent ion to all). 
5. 721 F.2d at 1403. 
6. Id. at 1406-07; see 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(8) (Supp. v 1981) (unfair labor practice for 
labor organization to "fail or refuse to comply with any provision of this chapter"); see also 
id. § 7114(a)(I) (exclusive union representative responsible for representing interests of all 
employees in bargaining unit in nondiscriminatory manner and without regard to union member-
ship status). 
7. 721 F.2d at 1404. Of the 120,000 employees in the bargaining unit represented by NTEU, 
approximately 65,000 are dues paying union members. Id. 
8. Id. Representation was provided in matters pertaining to collective bargaining rights. Id. 
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11 ,491, which mandated union representation of all bargaining unit 
employees without discrimination. 9 Additionally, the FLRA found the 
union policy an improper interference with an employee's statutory 
right to refrain from joining the union. lo Congress, however, subse-
quently enacted the Labor-Management Statute, codified in the Civil 
Service Reform Act (CSRA), which superseded yet reinforced the man-
date of the executive orders. II Notwithstanding the new statute, the 
union expressed its intention to maintain the policy on representation. 12 
The Customs Service and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission subse-
quently filed unfair labor practice charges against NTEU. 13 
An administrative law judge of the FLRA found that the union's 
policy of considering union membership when providing representa-
tion violated fair representation obligations and thus constituted an 
unfair labor practice under the Labor-Management Statute,, 4 After 
9. National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 202, I F.L.R.A. (No. 104) 909, 914 (1979); 
see Exec. Order No. 11,491, (as amended), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 app. at 793-98 (Supp. 
V 1981) (exclusive bargaining representative responsible for nondiscriminatory representation). 
Section lO(e) of Executive Order 11,491 contains language virtually identical to Section 7114(a)(I) 
of the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Statute (Labor-Management Statute). 5 
U.S.C. § 7114(a)(I) (Supp. V 1981). This language requires fair representation of all employee 
interests. Id. 
10. National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 202, I F.L.R.A. (No. 104) 909, 914 (1979). 
Both the Executive Order and the Labor-Management Statute make it an unfair labor practice 
to interfere, coerce, or restrain employees in the exercise of their rights to join or refrain from 
participating in union activities. See Exec. Order No. 11,491, §§ 19(a)(I)-(a)(5) (as amended), 
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 note at 316 (Supp. v 1981) (prohibiting interference with 
employee rights). 
11. 5 U .S.C. § 7l14(a)(I) (Supp. V 1981). The Civil Service Reform Act gave a legislative 
base to federal labor policy, removing it from the exclusive control of executive orders. Coleman, 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978: Its Meaning and Its Roots, 31 LAB. L.J. 200, 206 (1980). 
12. 721 F.2d at 1404. Following the decision by the Federal Labor Relations Authority 
(FLRA), the NTEU president sent an explanatory memorandum to all union chapters. Id. The 
memorandum disclosed that the union would not change its policy, because the FLRA ruling 
was based "on something [the executive order] no longer in existence." Id. 
13. Id. at 1404-05. Several employees in the NTEU bargaining unit were involved in removal 
actions at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See Brief for FLRA at 6, National Treasury 
Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 721 F.2d 1402 (D.C. CiT. 1983) (discuss-
ing implementation of attorney representation policy). While two union member employees 
received attorney representation, one non-union employee had no union attorney representa-
tion; it is, however, unclear whether the non-union employee had private attorney representa-
tion. 721 F.2d at 1402. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 7114(5)(A) (Supp. v 1981) (employee has right 
to choose non-union representation). 
The unfair labor practice charges alleged discriminatory standards for representation based 
solely on whether employees were union members. 721 F.2d at 1402. The union, however, 
did provide a union-trained shop steward or officer to represent the employee if an attorney 
was not provided. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal 
Labor Relations Auth., 721 F.2d 1402 (D.C. CiT. 1983). 
14. National Treasury Employees Union, 10 F.L.R.A. (No. 91) 519, 525 (1981); see 5 U.S.C. 
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the union filed exceptions, the FLRA affirmed the administrative deci-
sion and ordered the union to cease and desist from providing dif-
ferent standards of employee representation solely on the basis of union 
membership. Il On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia reviewed and affirmed the FLRA's orders. 16 
Federal sector labor policy initially developed with Executive Orders 
10,988 and 11,491, which, modeled after private sector labor legisla-
tion, governed labor-management relations. 17 These orders made possi-
ble viable labor organizing in the Federal sector. 18 The Labor-
Management Statute, codified in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 
preempted the executive orders and provided a statutory base for 
§§ 7116(b)(I), (b)(8) (Supp. v 1981) (any violation of statutory obligations constitutes an un-
fair labor practice); id. § 7114(a)(I) (union has duty of nondiscriminatory representation without 
regard to union membership). 
15. National Treasury Employees Union, 10 F.L.R.A. (No. 91) 519, - (1982). Although 
union members did not always receive union attorney representation and membership status 
was not, according to the union, the sole and dispositive factor, the administrative law judge 
(ALJ) ruled that any consideration of union membership was improper under the Labor-
Management Statute. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal 
Labor Relations Auth., 721 F.2d 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1983). But c/. National Treasury Employees 
Union, 10 F.L.R.A. (No. 91) 519, 525 (1981) (finding by ALJ that union membership status 
dispositive factor). 
The ALJ, however, recognized that unions may consider factors other than union member-
ship in evaluating whether to provide attorney representation. National Treasury Employees 
Union, 10 F.L.R.A. (No. 91) 519, 525 (1981); see Brief for FLRA at 8-9, National Treasury 
Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 721 F.2d 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (unions 
can consider factors other than union membership so long as applied uniformly and non-
discriminatorily). In deciding whether to provide attorney representation, the union considered 
the merits and potential impact of the case on other employees, the ability of the local union 
representative to handle the case, the availability of a union attorney, and union membership. 
Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations 
Auth., 721 F.2d 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
16. 721 F.2d at 1402. 
17. See 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 Comp.) (Kennedy executive order 10,988, mandating 
employee-management cooperation in federal service); 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-1970 Comp.) (Nixon 
executive order 11,491, providing substantive organizational rights). 
18. See Coleman, supra note II, at 200-01 (describing executive orders as roots of federal 
labor law). Within two years of the adoption of the first executive order (Kennedy Order 10,988), 
granting workers in the federal sector the right to organize, approximately 250,000 federal 
employees belonged to bargaining units. Coleman, supra note II, at 2O()..{)1. The Kennedy Order, 
while providing employees with basic organizational rights, was more conceptual than substan-
tive. Coleman, supra note II, at 200-01. As the number of organized workers neared one million, 
pressure increased to expand the applicability of the Executive Order. U.S. CJvn. SERVICE COMM'N, 
UNION RECOGNmoN IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 26 (1974). Thus, President Nixon issued 
Executive Order No. 11,491, creating protections to safeguard the employee rights established 
by the Kennedy Order. Coleman, supra note II, at 201. 
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), the first comprehensive American 
labor organizing law applicable to the private sector, specifically excluded federal employees. 
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federal labor-management relations. 19 Continuing the parallel to private 
sector labor relations, the Labor-Management Statute affirmed the 
organizational rights and representational obligations previously 
established by executive orders.20 Under the statute, a union is respon-
sible for the nondiscriminatory representation of all bargaining unit 
employees without regard to union membership.21 Furthermore, the 
duty of fair representation, a judicially created doctrine derived from 
the private sector, extends protection to all individual employees in 
the bargaining unit. 22 
See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976) (specifically excluding federal employees from scope of Wagner 
Act). Moreover, in 1955, Congress made the act of striking the government a felony, thereby 
providing further evidence of the government's restrictive attitude toward federal employees' 
union activities. See Pub. L. No. 330, 69 Stat. 624 (1955) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1918(3) 
(1982» (striking of government a felony). The Wagner Act promoted private sector collective 
bargaining and union organizing. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 200 (discussing history of 
labor relations in private and federal sectors). In 1947, Congress amended the Wagner Act 
by passing the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA); in various provisions of the LMRA, 
Congress attempted to restrict abuses by powerful unions. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1935), 
as amended by Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (regulating union 
behavior). See generally Coleman, supra note 11, at 200 (tracing development of labor law). 
Public employee rights were adopted almost verbatim from the private sector legislation. 
Coleman, supra note 11, at 201. Additionally, the new statute required the imposition of the 
private sector concept of good faith bargaining. Coleman, supra note 11, at 201. 
19. Title VII, Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, 1191-1216 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-35 (Supp. V 1981». The Civil Service Reform Act, however, 
did not significantly alter the government's restrictive approach toward bargaining with federal 
employees. Coleman, supra note 11, at 200-03. It has been estimated that only 40010 of private 
sector issues are bargainable at the federal level. Coleman, supra note 11, at 203 n.21. 
20. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 7104 (Supp. V 1981) (creating Federal Labor Relations Authority) 
with 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976) (creating National Labor Relations Board). The General Counsel 
of the FLRA is responsible for prosecuting those charged with unfair labor practices and FLRA 
decisions are now subject to judicial review and enforcement. See 5 U.S.C. § 7123 (Supp. 
V 1981) Uudicial review and enforcement of FLRA orders); see also id. § 7105 (enumerating 
powers and duties of FLRA); Frazier, Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Govern-
ment, 30 LAB. L.J. 131, 131-34 (1979) (discussing important ramifications of Civil Service Reform 
Act). 
The Federal Labor Relations Council, predecessor to the Federal Labor Relations Authority, 
was comprised of the Secretary of Labor and the Director of the Office of Budget and headed 
by the Chairperson of the Federal Civil Service Commission. See Frazier, supra, at 131-38 
(Federal Labor Relations Council administered on part-time basis). The FLRA was established 
as an independent, bipartsan, full-time committee whose members are appointed for a fixed 
term. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 202-03 (comparing FLRA with National Labor Relations 
Board). See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7102, 7116 (Supp. v 1981) (respectively: enunciating 
legitimate policy reasons for legislation, providing for preservation of employee rights to organize 
or refrain from activity without penalty, and enumerating unfair labor practices). 
21. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(I) (Supp. V 1981). 
22. Compare id. § 7114 (imposing on union duty of fair, nondiscriminatory representation 
in public sector) with 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976) (private sector union must represent interests 
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In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,23 the United States 
Supreme Court imposed on unions a duty of fair representation. 24 
Subsequent decisions incorporated the elements of good faith and 
honesty into the interpretation of the fair representation duty.25 
Additionally, in Vaca v. Sipes, the Court held that union conduct 
may not be "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. "26 Substantial 
evidence that union discrimination is "intentional, severe and unrelated 
to legitimate union objectives" is necessary to prove breach of the 
fair representation duty.27 
The duty extends beyond negotiation of the collective bargaining 
agreement into the realm of enforcement and administration of the 
terms of the agreement. 28 The duty of fair representation, however, 
does not require the extension of all internal union benefits to non-
union members.29 Moreover, when the union properly accounts for 
the interests of non-members, the union does not unlawfully 
of all employees of bargaining unit fairly without discrimination). See generally Summers, The 
Individual Employee's Rights Under The Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Represen-
tation, 126 u. PA. L. REV. 251, 252-53 (1977) (judicially-created obligation of union to equally 
protect those represented). 
Because exclusive representation naturally precludes individual action, the United States Supreme 
Court has intervened to protect individual interests. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 
323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944) (union may not racially discriminate). Steele, the seminal case 
involving the duty of fair representation, arose under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U .S.C. §§ 
151-188 (1970). Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192,202-03 (1944). Subsequently, 
the Court held the duty of fair representation applicable under the National Labor Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970). See Syres v. Oil Workers Int'I Union, Local 23, 350 U.S. 
892, 892 (1955) (citing Steele and holding that National Labor Relations Act imposed com-
parable duty of fair representation); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) 
(union discretion in contract negotiation subject to duty of complete good faith and honesty 
to serve all employees' interests). The Steele Court determined that race was an irrelevant ground 
for discrimination and that the duty of fair representation prohibited consideration of race. 
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944). 
23. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The Steele Court held that a union must represent the interests 
of all of the members of a bargaining unit. Id. at 202. 
24. Id. 
25. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 569 (1976) (fair representation 
duty prevents union from arbitrarily ignoring meritorious claim); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 
U.S. 335, 342 (1964) (duty of fair representation is breached by dishonest, fraudulent conduct); 
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953) (union must represent employees 
honestly). 
26. 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). 
27. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 
U.S. 274, 301 (1971). 
28. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957). Conley was the first case to apply the duty 
of fair representation to union activities with respect to the administration of the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 46. The Court recognized that a contract which 
appears to be fair may be administered in a discriminatory manner. !d. 
29. See Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting union 
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discriminate by excluding non-union members from certain aspects 
of the contract negotiation process.30 In Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines,31 
an analogous private sector case, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that although a union has the authority 
to determine the circumstances under which it will provide an attorney, 
non-union membership can play no part in that decision. 32 Contrary 
to the facts in the case-in-chief, union membership was the sole and 
dispositive factor in Del Casal where the union failed to provide the 
employee with any representation. 33 
In finding that the union had violated its statutory duty, the National 
Treasury court strictly and literally interpreted the applicable provi-
sions of the Labor-Management Statute. 34 Affording great deference 
to and upholding the FLRA decision, the court relied heavily upon 
the private sector standard of fair representation including good faith, 
honesty, and nonarbitrary conduct. 35 Dismissing as "patently meritless" 
the union's attempt to equate "fair" and "adequate" representation, 
the court reasoned that no minimum objective standard of adequacy 
existed. 36 To satisfy the duty of fair representation, the court observed, 
the union must apply a non-arbitrary standard in a non-discriminatory 
not required to extend internal benefits to non-members), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1982); 
NLRB v. Amalgamated Local 286, 222 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir. 1955) (union need not offer same 
insurance to non-members). 
30. See Branch 6000, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 232 N.L.R.B. 263, 264-66 (1977) 
(non-union members may be excluded from certain aspects of contract negotiation process), 
afl'd, 595 F.2d 808, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
31. 634 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1982). 
32. Id. at 301; see International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 697, 223 N.L.R.B. 832, 835 
(1976) (invalidating union policy of charging non-members for grievance representation costs); 
see a/so Library of Congress v. FLRA, 669 F.2d 1280, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (relevance of 
private sector case law to federal sector labor law varies depending on issues, statutory provi-
sions, and legal concepts). 
33. Compare Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1981) (no union 
representation provided because of non-union status) with 721 F.2d at 1404 (union provided 
representation to all employees). 
34. 721 F.2d at 1405-06. 
35. See id. (holding FLRA conclusions reasonable and compelled by statutory language). 
The Administrative Procedure Act governs judicial review of FLRA orders. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 
706(2)(a), 7123(c) (1982) (detailing judicial review of FLRA). A decision of the FLRA may 
be set aside if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
. with the applicable law. Id. § 706(2)(a). Courts may afford special scrutiny when examining 
decisions of the FLRA, and although not bound to uphold a statutory interpretation by the 
FLRA, a reasonable interpretation is entitled to some deference. 721 F.2d at 1405; see National 
Federation of Fed. Employees v. FLRA, 652 F.2d 191, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (special judicial 
scrutiny of FLRA). 
36. 721 F.2d at 1406. The union claimed that shop stewards and other union officials satisfied 
the mandate of providing adequate representation for the employees, because they were trained 
by the union and had a good record of successful representation. Id. . 
1984) CASE COMMENTS 851 
manner. 37 Viewing the policy as plainly discriminatory, the court noted 
that even the union recognized that non-attorney representation was 
not equal to attorney representation. 31 
The court also dismissed the union's argument that attorney represen-
tation is an internal union benefit and an incident of membership. 39 
The court reasoned that because representation is inextricably related 
to enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement, an exclusive 
bargaining agent cannot limit the benefit of attorney representation 
to union members. 40 Continuing its analysis, the court disposed of 
the union's purported distinction between adequate representation in 
the present case and the lack of representation in the Del Casal case 
and consummated the decision with the rationale that a union must 
provide representation without regard to the employee's union member-
ship status. 41 The court thus upheld the decision of the FLRA, finding 
the union policy in direct contravention of the statutory language and 
of the legislative history. 42 
The court's decision, a strict and literal statutory interpretation, 
ignores both the underlying fundamental purposes of and the realities 
faced by labor unions within the federal sector. 43 Narrow interpreta-
tion of the statute undermines the ability of unions to foster the volun-
tary membership support which is necessary in the federal sector due 
to the unavailability of union security contracts.44 To remain vital, 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. The union argued that attorney representation should be viewed as an internal union 
benefit and that the union possessed discretion to provide attorney representation to its members. 
[d. 
40. Id. at 1406-07. 
41. Id. at 1407; see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing Del Cosal). 
42. Id. at 1405-07. The legislative history demonstrates that unions must represent the in-
terests of all employees in the bargaining unit, regardless of union membership. H.R. REP. 
No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1978). 
43. See 721 F.2d at 1406-07 (discussing strict and literal approach); 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (Supp. 
V 1981) (stating congressional policies behind statutory provisions). Congress recognized that 
effective and amicable dispute settlements are an important public policy consideration. Id. 
Moreover, employee rights to unionize are viewed as an important vehicle toward the facilita-
tion of dispute resolution. Id. 
44. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48-52 (1979) (stressing 
need to preserve financial stability of unions to avoid impairing effectiveness); In re American 
Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 987, 3 F.L.R.A. (No. 115) 5, _ (1980) (breach of duty 
of fair representation narrowly defined to allow union broad discretion to protect viability of 
organization). Cf. L. IMUNDO, LABOR/MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AMONG GoVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
173-81 (H. Kershen ed. 1983) (federal employees join unions for different reasons than private 
employees). Federal employee unions must depend exclusively on voluntary membership fees 
as a financial base. See id. (financial stability important concern in federal sector where unions 
unable to compel dues or service fees and bargaining unit huge in comparison to union 
membership). 
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unions need to provide incentives for employees to become union 
members. 4s The court's holding, therefore, is unrealistic because unions 
cannot viably advance collective bargaining and private dispute settle-
ment if employees can retain all of the benefits and the work pro-
duct of union bargaining without providing any financial or person-
nel support. 
Collective union goals and individual employee rights are not always 
compatible. Courts, therefore, must strive to balance the potential 
harm to non-union employees against the burden placed on unions. 46 
The National Treasury court failed to adequately examine the com-
peting interests, concentrating instead on a strict interpretation of the 
statutory language. 47 Although there is a fine line between creating 
incentives for union membership and undue interference with individual 
employee rights, courts have never interpreted a union's obligation 
of fair representation to include identical treatment and benefits for 
all individual employees, for such an interpretation would place unions 
in an untenable position. 48 
Interpreting fair representation as synonymous with attorney 
representation may financially incapacitate unions and undermine their 
efficiency in collective bargaining as well as in dispute resolution. 49 
The union may be faced with the untenable choice of providing all 
employees with attorney representation or providing no attorney 
45. See Brief for Petitioner at 13, National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor 
Relations Auth., 721 F.2d 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (viability of unions in federal sector depen-
dent upon attractiveness to foster membership). Moreover, financially, NTEU is only a break-
even operation. Id. 
46. See T. BOYCE, FAIR REPRESENTATION, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS 3-4, 119-21 (Lab. 
ReI. and Pub. Pol'y Series No. 18, 1978) (discussing individual versus collective interests). See 
generally Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary Framework 
and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1096, 1143-52 
(1974) (discussing duty of fair representation as protection for individual employees). 
47. 721 F.2d at 1405. 
48. See, e.g., Local 138, Int'I Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 130, 135-39 
(2d Cir. 1963) (non-union members required to pay fee to use hiring hall funded by union 
dues); NLRB v. Amalgamated Local 286, 222 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir. 1955) (union need not 
offer non-union members identical insurance); Branch 6000, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 
232 N.L.R.B. 263, 266 (1977) (no unfair labor practice if non-union members excluded from 
certain aspects of contract negotiation process), afl'd, 595 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
49. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48-52 (1979) (financial 
stability important to union viability as bargaining representative); cf. Grovner v. Georgia-Pacific 
Co., 625 F.2d 1289, 1291 (5th Cir. 1980) (no breach of fair representation duty when union, 
rather than attorney, representation provided to employee). It is important to note that out 
of the 120,000 bargaining unit members represented by NTEU, only 65,000 are dues-paying 
union members. 721 F.2d at 1404; see Brief for Petitioner at 12-14, National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 721 F.2d 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (representational tasks 
at issue typically not performed by attorneys). 
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representation at all. 50 Even if the unions were to exclude considera-
tion of union membership status in determining whether to provide 
an attorney, the costs of defending unfair labor practice claims by 
those denied attorney representation would be substantially onerous. 51 
Although the duty of fair representation protects individual employee 
rights, it is difficult to maintain a balance between individual and 
collective interests. 52 The courts, therefore, generally realize that unions 
must be afforded broad discretion in order to act effectively. 53 Unions 
themselves have an inherent interest in fairly representing all employees 
to gain support in collective bargaining efforts. In order for the union 
to effectively and efficiently bargain with management, the union must 
obtain and maintain a majority mandate from the employees. 54 
Achieving the symmetry that would effectively balance individual and 
collective rights entails maximizing individual protections and minimiz-
ing judicial interference with intra-union interests. 
Beth d. Cohen 
50. See 721 F.2d at 1404 (NTEU employs only 40 attorneys for entire bargaining unit of 
120,000 employees). 
51. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (Supp. V 1981) (public interest and fundamental purpose 
to encourage dispute settlement through use of labor organizations). Dispensing with all at-
torney representation would widen the disparity in bargaining position between employees and 
management, further weakening union standing. T. BOYCE, supra note 46, at 3 (labor policy 
to strengthen employees' rights through united front of union). 
The court did not find NTEU guilty of inadequate representation. See Brief for Petitioner 
at 18-20, National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 721 F.2d at 
1402, 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (no harm or injury to any employee in bargaining unit). 
52. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text (discussing judicial development of duty 
of fair representation to protect individual employees). 
53. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) (unions possess broad 
discretion). 
54. See 5 U.S.C. § 7105 (Supp. V 1981) (majority of employees must select labor organiza-
tion as exclusive representative). See generally Summers, supra note 22, at 253 (1977) (union 
owes fiduciary duty to employees represented). 
